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Abstract
We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among rms in which also the timing of
R&D investments is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature,
the endogenous formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. This allows to consider the
formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs
are su¢ ciently low, rms may nd di¢ cult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to
invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint
investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are su¢ ciently high,
cooperation in R&D constitutes a protable option, although rms also possess an incentive to sequence
their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge mainly leaks from
the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely protable, making R&D alliances hard to
sustain unless rms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D.
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1 Introduction
A long-standing theme in the industrial organization literature has been the explanation of
the incentives for rms to form R&D alliances and the analysis of the e¤ects of cooperation
on innovation and social welfare. A clear understanding of this phenomenon is indeed crucial
to guide technology and industrial policies. In this article we approach this issue by focussing
on the role of strategic timing in shaping the incentive for rms to engage in R&D cooperative
agreements (or R&D cartels).
As is well known, a research agreement is an alliance between rms in order to coordinate
their research and development activities in a joint project, and to share, to some extent,
the knowledge obtained from this common e¤ort. Therefore, the creation of such research
agreements allows the rms not only to coordinate their research e¤orts but also to improve
information-sharing. Many reasons may induce rms to form research cartels. First, in-
novation is expensive, and the possibility of cost sharing and avoidance of duplication can
strongly diminish the expenses to each member. Second, the risk for a rm that its own
innovation programmes will not produce valuable results is reduced, since a research agree-
ment has greater possibilities of diversication and each member can share risks with the
other members. Third, the members of a research alliance can acquire a greater competitive
advantage than nonmembers, which implies that there can be a concrete hazard in being left
out of such cartels (see on this topic, Baumol 1992; see also Katz and Ordover 1990, Hernan
et al. 2003 and Alonso and Marin 2004 for empirical studies).
The IO literature has also stressed the role of knowledge ows (or spillovers) for R&D co-
operation. On one side, both theoretical and empirical studies emphasize how spillovers may
enhance the benets stemming from R&D cooperation. When spillovers are high enough,
internalizing them produces an increase in the aggregate level of R&D, and the elimination of
duplication e¤orts, which clearly leads to a reduction in research expenditures. On the other
hand, high spillovers - typical of loose appropriability regimes - also increase the incentive
to cheat by partners in research alliances and prot from free-riding, thus threatening the
stability of the research cartel (Kesteloot and Veugelers 1995, Cassiman and Veugelers 2002,
Belderbos et al. 2004).
Let us consider, as an example, the pharmaceutical sector. While this sector has witnessed
a plethora of research agreements over the last years, probably also in light of the substantial
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technical and market uncertainty inherent in pharmaceutical R&D, only about one third
of all alliances between pharmaceutical and biotechnology rms are formed at the initial
development stage of the new drug (see Rogers et al. 2005 and Recombinant Capital web
site).1 Even though the management literature stresses mainly the role of market uncertainty
and risk aversion by rms in committing capital to highly uncertain developmental projects,
we argue that there could be an interplay between the choice of signing a research agreement
at a given time and the di¤erent strategies to appropriate innovation rents, such as patenting,
exploitation of rst mover advantage, internalization of information ows, and so on. In
this paper we emphasize the strategic use of the timing of R&D investment made by the
participants to an R&D collaboration. In particular, a research agreement can strategically
be anticipated or postponed to prevent some of its participants from unilaterally exploting
a rst or second mover advantage in the noncooperative scenario.
With the exception of a few papers, very scant attention is paid to strategic timing issues
in both theoretical and empirical studies. among the others, Duso et al (2010), analyze the
drivers of alliance dynamics across heterogeneous industrial sectors, and observe that rms
may prefer to wait and enter a research coalition at a subsequent moment of time, since, in
each period of time they weight the benets against the costs of being a research cartel mem-
ber. This study nds that, on average, four rms enter a research joint venture (RJV) yearly,
while the average entry decreases with the age of these RJVs. In the theoretical literature,
a number of papers, departing from dAspremont and Jacquemins (1988) pioneering work,
have analyzed the e¤ects of research alliances in models with endogenous R&D (see, among
others, Katz and Ordover 1990, Kamien et al. 1992, Suzumura 1992, Petit and Tolwinski,
1997, 1999). However, in these models, the creation of research agreements is exogenously
assumed.
More recently, the endogenous coalition formation literature has attempted to endogenize
the formation of R&D cartels by applying noncooperative models of coalition formation (see
Bloch 2003 and 2004 and Yi and Shin 2000). Here a crucial aspect to assess the stability
of a given structure of agreements among rms is the sign of the externalities of R&D
investments which, in turn, depend on the level of spillovers. For su¢ ciently high spillovers,
forming a research cartel reduces the underinvestment in R&D, since the externalities due
1These stylized facts are consistent with what emerges from the R&D Insight database employed by
Danzon et al. 2005, insofar as they assess the propensity to strategically delay some of the agreements over
time.
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to the public-good nature of R&D investments are internalized. Thus, alliances of rms
can invest more than small groups, and this, in turn, may trigger some rms to leave the
coalition and free ride on the existing cartels. Moreover, di¤erent R&D alliance formation
rules may yield di¤erent outcomes in terms of stability of cooperation (see, for instance, Yi
& Shin 2000). In some cases, the whole industry alliance of rms investing in R&D can be
stable, especially if there are no synergies and, after breaking the agreement, all rms end up
investing as singletons (see, for instance, Yi 2003, Bloch 2003 and Marini 2008 for surveys).
However, the stability of alliances is no longer guaranteed if rms are assumed to decide
endogenously their timing of investment.
The endogenous-timing approach was rstly introduced by Hamilton and Slutskys (1990)
within a duopoly game. In their extensive game with observable delay, the authors describe
a two stage setup in which, at a preplay stage, two players (duopolists) decide independently
whether to move early or late in the basic game (e.g., a duopoly quantity game). If both
players announce the same timing, that is (early, early) or (late, late), the basic game is
played simultaneously. If the playerstime-announcements di¤er, the basic game is played
sequentially, with the order of moves as announced by the players. It is shown that the two
leader-follower congurations (with either order of play) constitute pure subgame perfect
equilibria of the extended game only if at least one players payo¤ as follower weakly domi-
nates her corresponding payo¤ in the simultaneous game. When, conversely, the payo¤ of a
follower is lower than in the simultaneous case, the only pure strategy subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium prescribes that both players play simultaneously.
A few recent papers have introduced the possibility for rms to sequence their R&D activities
in a model à la dAspremont & Jacquemin (1988) with asymmetric spillovers. While some of
these works assume a given exogenous timing for the investment game (Goel 1990, Crampes
and Langinier 2003, Halmenschlager 2004, Atallah 2005, De Bondt 2007) some others endo-
genize the timing of investment (Amir et al. 2000, Tesoriere 2008) by adopting a framework
à la Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). The degree of technological spillovers is shown to be
crucial for these games to possess strategic substitutes vs. strategic complements attributes
and, thus, to give rise to simultaneous vs. sequential endogenous timing R&D equilibria (see
Amir et al., 2000). Nevertheless, these models, comparing sequential versus simultaneous
move games, do not consider explicitly the possibility for rms to form research agreements.
Our purpose in this paper is to bridge these two otherwise separate streams of literature,
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the noncooperative formation of R&D agreements and the endogenous timing approach, with
the aim to study the formation of research alliances when the timing of R&D investments
is endogenous. This allows for a far more complete picture of R&D agreements, by consid-
ering the possible formation of these agreements over time. It is shown that, when both
R&D spillovers and investment costs are su¢ ciently low, rms may nd di¢ cult to maintain
a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In
such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs
at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are su¢ ciently high,
cooperation in R&D constitutes a protable option, although rms also possess an incen-
tive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and
the knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes
extremely protable, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless rms strategically delay
their joint investment in R&D. Some of these results can provide an explanation to various
stylized facts, such as the tendency of rms to strategically anticipate or postpone their R&D
agreements as due to di¤erent levels of their R&D investment costs and spillover rates.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the notation and introduces
the setup adopted in the paper. Section 3 and 4 apply this setup by building a model à
la dAspremont & Jacquemin (1988) with symmetric and asymmetric R&D spillovers and
present the main results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Setup
The typical modelling approach to R&D collaboration among rms usually assumes that,
at a rst stage, rms can form an R&D alliance with their competitors and, at a second
stage, the formed alliance decides cooperatively its joint level of investment in R&D. At a
third and nal stage, every rm sets noncooperatively its strategic market variable, typically
quantity or price, to compete oligopolistically with all other rms. Our aim is to introduce
a variant of this setup assuming that at the rst stage each rm decides not only whether
to form or not an R&D agreement, but also the timing of its investment in R&D. More
specically, both the R&D agreement formation process and the timing of the investment
are made endogenous. Introducing endogenous timing basically determines at which stage of
the game a single rm or an R&D cartel will play its investment in R&D. This feature of the
model aims to capture the complementarity between the timing of rm R&D investments
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and the formation of a research cartels. We here focus our analysis on the two-rm case.
2.1 R&D Alliances & Timing Formation Game
We assume that, at a pre-play stage, denoted with t0, each rm i (i = 1; 2) sends simul-
taneously a message to its rival announcing both its intention to form irrevocably an R&D
alliance or stay as singleton as well as its intention to commit to a specic timing for its
R&D investment. Every rm message set Mi can be denoted as:
(1) Mi = [(fi; jg ; t1) ; (fi; jg ; t2) ; (fig ; t1) ; (fig ; t2)] i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
The message space M contains 16 di¤erent message proles m 2 M1 M2, which, in turn,
can induce the following set of nonempty R&D timing-partitions P (m),
P = [ f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 ;  f1gt1 ; f2gt1 ;  f1gt2 ; f2gt2 ;  f1gt1 ; f2gt2 ;  f1gt2 ; f2gt1]:
Di¤erently from the Hamilton and Slutskys (1990) endogenous timing game applied to the
R&D investment game (see, for instance, Amir et al. 2000), here the two rms may also form
a research cartel either at period t1 or t2.2 In our model the temporal choice of an R&D
cartel is purely strategic and is made to prevent the rival rm to exploit noncooperatively
a rst or second mover advantage. We will assume that, in order to be formed, a research
alliance with a given timing of investment in R&D requires the unanimity of rms decisions.
If rms send messages indicating both the same R&D alliance and the same investment
timing, then they will sign a binding agreement to invest at the prescribed time. Otherwise,
if one rm disagrees, either on the alliance or on the timing of investment, both rms will play
as singletons the R&D investment game, with the timing indicated by their own messages.
Formally, for i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i

P (m) = f1; 2g if mi = mj = (fi; jg ; ) and
P (m) = (fig i ; fjgj) if mi 6= mj.
Note that this R&D agreement formation rule reects an exclusive membership rule, i.e. one
in which the consensus of all members is required to complete the agreement.3
2Note that by allowing the two rms to cooperate across time, one playing cooperatively at time t1 and
the other at timet2, does not alter the basic results of the analysis.
3For a discussion on which coalition formation rule may be more appropriate according to the specic
context, see the discussion contained in Hart & Kurz (1983), Yi (2003) and Ray (2007).
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2.2 The Investment Game
Once a message prole has been sent and a timing-partition, denoted P (m) 2 P, has been
induced, each rm will optimally choose its cooperative or noncooperative investment level
according to the timing prescribed by P (m). At this stage, as well as at the following stages,
it is assumed that a rm cannot manipulate its level of investment to convince the rival to
renege the timing-partition decided at t0.
As in dAspremont & Jacquemin (1988), each rm i, with i = 1; 2, is assumed to set a
nite level of investment xi 2 Xi  R+ a¤ecting its prot via its production cost ci(x1; x2)
which, in turn, inuences the market competition between individual rms. Denoting with
qi 2 [0;1) the market competition variable (here quantity), a rm prot function can be
denoted as i(q (x)), where q (x) = (q1(x1; x2); q2(x1; x2)).
In a research agreement f1; 2g rms will therefore set cooperatively their level of invest-
ment at stage  = t1 or t2, i.e.
(2) xc

=
 
xc

1 ; x
c
2

such that, for every i; j = 1; 2 and j 6= i
xc

i = argmax
xi
X
i=1;2
i
 
q
 
xi; x
c
j

;
given the prole of quantities optimally chosen at the market stage.
If the rms play simultaneously as singletons at time  = t1 or t2, the appropriate
equilibrium concept will be the Nash equilibrium x of the simultaneous investment game
played at stage  , i.e.
(3) x = (x1 ; x

2 )
such that, for every i = 1; 2 and j 6= i
xi = argmax
xi
i
 
q
 
xi; x

j

:
Finally, if the rms play sequentially, the relevant equilibrium will be a Stackelberg
(subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium, i.e. the prole
(4) x =
 
xi ; x

j

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such that, for the leader (henceforth rm i)
xi = argmax
xi
i (q (xi; gj (xi))) ;
and for the follower (rm j) xj = gj (x

i ), where gj : Xi ! Xj is the best-reply mapping:
gj (xi) = argmax
xj
j (q (xi; xj)) :
Note that for the investment game to be well-dened, all equilibria in (2), (3) and (4) must
exist and be unique.
2.3 The Market Game
Once the two rms have either formed a research cartel or chosen their R&D investment
as singletons at t1 or t2, they will set their market variable at the last stage of the game
(denoted with t3). We assume competition in quantities and a unique Cournot equilibrium
among rms, given the equilibrium level of investment xc

, or x or x decided at stages
t1, t2 or both. In particular, the Cournot quantity prole is simply the vector
q = (q1; q

2)
such that, for every rm i = 1; 2 and j 6= i;
qi = argmax
qi
i(qi; q

j ):
2.4 Stable R&D Agreements
Given the equilibrium quantities decided by rms at stage t3, and given the level of investment
decided simultaneously or sequentially at stages t1 and/or t2 either by the research cartel
or by individual rms, rms payo¤s can, with a slight abuse of notation, be denoted as
i(q
 (x(P (m))), where q (x(P (m)) indicates the equilibrium quantity prole when an
investment prole, as dened by (2), or by (3) or nally by (4) is chosen by the rms in a
given partition P (m) induced by the message prole m sent at stage t0.
Henceforth we make explicit a concept of equilibrium for the message game played at stage
t0. For this purpose, we introduce two di¤erent equilibrium concepts. The rst is a standard
Nash equilibrium of the R&D partition-timing game. The second introduces a social stability
requirement, implying that a structure P (m) is stable if and only if the message prolem is a
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strong Nash equilibrium, i.e., cannot be improved upon by an alternative message announced
by a single rm or by the two rms together. This concept is useful to rene over the set of
outcome generated by our model. Formally, when a given timing-partition P 2 P is Nash
stable, the prole  = (m;x;q) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the
entire game. When, in addition, the message prole m played at t0 is also strong Nash, 

IS again a SPNE, with the additional property to be Pareto-optimal for the rms.
Denition 1 (Nash stability) A feasible R&D timing-partition P 2 P is Nash stable if
P = P (m), for some m with the following property:
i (q
 (x(P (m)))  i(q(x(P (m0i;mj)))
for every m
0
i 2Mi and every rm i = 1; 2 with j 6= i.
Denition 2 (Strong Nash stability) A feasible R&D timing-partition P 2 P is strongly
stable if P = P ( bm), for some bm with the following property: there not exists an alternative
message prole m0 2M1 M2 such that
i(q
(x(P (m0)))  i(q(x(P ( bm)))
for all i = 1; 2 and
h(q
(x(P (m0))) > h(q(x(P ( bm)))
for at least one h = 1; 2.
A strong stable Nash equilibrium is at once a Nash equilibrium and a Pareto-optimal
message prole.
3 A Duopoly Model with Symmetric Spillovers
We are now ready to apply our framework to the dAspremont & Jacquemins (1988) model.
We therefore consider a symmetric duopoly with rms producing a homogeneous good. Along
these lines, we assume a linear inverse market demand function
P (Q) = max f0; a  bQg ;
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withQ =
P2
i=1 qi and a linear cost function for each rm i decreasing in own R&D investment
and in a fraction of the rivals e¤ort,
(5) ci(xi; xj) = (c  xi   xj)
for j 6= i, and c  xi   xj. In this setup, learning resulting from investment in R&D
characterizes the production process, implying that marginal and unit costs decrease as the
investment in R&D increases. We allow for the possibility of imperfect appropriability (i.e.
for the existence of a technological spillovers between the rms), by introducing a spillover
parameter  2 [0; 1]. Obviously the case of no spillovers ( = 0) may only arise in a situation
of complete intellectual protection. More frequently, however, involuntary information leaks
occur due to reverse engineering, industrial espionage or by hiring away employees of an
innovative rm. The cases of partial to full spillovers can be modelled by setting 0 <   1.
Here, the parameter  in (5) is assumed to be identical for all rms. However, in Section
4, this parameter, though exogenously given, will di¤er as due to the cooperative versus
non-cooperative nature and to the timing properties of the R&D investment game.
Moreover, we assume a simple quadratic cost function for the investment in R&D given
by
Ii(xi) = 
x2i
2
;
with  > 0. This guarantees decreasing returns to R&D expenditure (see e.g. Cheng 1984
and dAspremont and Jacquemin 1988). As a result, under Cournot competition in the
product market, and setting for simplicity b = 1, the last stage prot function for each rm
i = 1; 2 can be obtained as a function of (xi; xj):
(6) i (q (xi; xj)) =
(a  c+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj)2
9
  
2
x2i :
3.1 Main Assumptions
Some assumptions are now introduced to ensure the existence and uniqueness of all stages
equilibria as well as to simplify the comparative statics.
A.1 Quantity stage constraint : (a=c) > 2.
A.2 Prot concavity and best-reply contraction:  > 4=3.
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A.3 Boundaries on R&D e¤orts: for every rm, Xi = [0; c]. Moreover, for  < 1=2, we
assume  > a(2 )(+1)
4:5c
and for  > 1=2,  > a(+1)
2
4:5c
.
As explained in detail in the Appendix, assumption A.1 simply ensures that the last
stage Cournot equilibrium is unique and interior, with associated positive prots.
Assumption A.2 guarantees both the strict concavity of every rm non-cooperative payo¤
(6) in its own investment xi (guaranteed for  > 89) as well as a contraction property on
every rm best-replies gi(xj), which requires that  > 43 .
Assumption A.3 ensures a compact R&D investment set for every rm and imposes
some Inada-type conditions to obtain interior investment equilibria in all non-cooperative
(simultaneous or sequential) and cooperative R&D games (see also Amir et al. 2000, Amir
et al. 2011a, Tesoriere 2008 and Stepanova and Tesoriere 2011).4
Note that by assumption A.2 every rm payo¤ is strictly concave in its own investment
choice and thus best-replies are single-valued and continuous. Investment sets are compact by
A.3 and therefore a Nash equilibrium exists by Brower xed-point theorem. The contraction
property implied by A.2 ensures uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium x. The existence of a
Stackelberg equilibrium x - a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the sequential
R&D game - is guaranteed by both rms continuous payo¤s and continuous best-replies,
thus implying that a rm as leader faces a continuous maximization problem over a closed
set. Then, by the Weierstrass theorem, such a SPNE equilibrium exists. Its uniqueness
is guaranteed here by A.3 and by the fact that rms best-replies are single-valued and
monotone. Relatively to the cooperative investment level, the strict concavity of every rm
prot, under the additional constraint that the two rms select the same collusive investment,
implies that also the joint R&D cartel prot is strictly concave. Hence, this will be maximized
by a unique investment prole x.
In the next section we characterize all stable R&D agreements with endogenous timing
reached by the two rms. As in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) the rms timing decision
is taken conditional on the subgame equilibrium prole induced by the resulting timing
structure. So, solving the game amounts to comparing the di¤erent basic games associated
to all possible scenarios. After a complete analysis of the symmetric case, we extend the
setup to the case of asymmetric spillovers. This can o¤er a broader view on a recent stream
4For a detailed description of the consequences occurring to the simultaneous investment game when
these boundaries are violated, see, for instance, Amir et al 2011b.
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of literature concerning endogenous timing under asymmetric spillovers (see, e.g., Amir et
al, 2000, De Bondt and Vandekerckhove 2008, Tesoriere 2008).
3.2 Cooperative R&D
The R&D cartel made of the two rms investing cooperatively in R&D is assumed to maxi-
mize the sum of rms prots, i.e.
(7)
2P
i=1
i (q
 (x (f1; 2g ))) =
2P
i=1

1
9
[a  c+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj]2   x
2
i
2

:
where x =(xi; xj) is any arbitrary prole of R&D investment carried out simultaneously by
the two rms either at  = t1 or at  = t2, for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i. Following most of the
literature, we will assume henceforth that the level of investment that maximizes (7) is equal
for every rm, i.e., is such that xc

i = x
c
j .
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By (7) a rm cooperative investment can be easily obtained as
(8) xc

i (f1; 2g ) =
2(a  c)(1 + )
9   2(1 + )2
with an associated equilibrium prot for each rm
(9) Ci
 
q
 
xc

(f1; 2g ) = (a  c)2
9   2(1 + )2 :
3.3 Noncooperative Simultaneous R&D
Di¤erentiating (6) and exploiting the symmetry of rms payo¤s, the noncooperative level of
investment is obtained as
(10) xi (f1g ; f2g ) =
2(a  c)(2  )
9   2(2  )(1 + )
for  = 1; 2, with associated a prot given by:
Ni (q
 (x (f1g ; f2g ))) = (a  c)
2(9   2(   2)2)
(9   2(2  )(1 + ))2 :
5As shown by Salant and Sha¤er (1998,1999), for certain values of the parameters, the joint prot maxi-
mization may easily imply unequal R&D investments for the two rms.
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3.4 Sequential R&D Investment Game
Using again (6) we can easily obtain the best-reply of the j-th rm playing as follower the
investment game:
(11) gj(xi) =
2(2  )(a  c  (1  2)xi)
9   2(   2)2 :
Therefore the leader and the follower equilibrium investment levels are given by
xi
 figt1 ; fjgt2 = 2 (2  ) (a  c)  3 + 22   2  6 + 3   22   4

xj
 figt1 ; fjgt2 = 2 (2  ) (a  c)  

where
  =
 
26   20   12   42 + 123 + 92   44   82 + 8
and
= 160   2162+813+325 86 4 (20 + 16)+3 (64   64)
+
 
2162   224 + 32+2  24   542 + 56 32
with associated equilibrium prots given by
Li
 
q
 
x
 figt1 ; fjgt2 = (a  c)2   6 + 3   22   42

Fj
 
q
 
x
 figt1 ; fjgt2 = (a  c)2(9 + 8   22   8) 2
2
Comparing R&D equilibrium investment levels under assumptions A.1-A.3, we can state
the following:
Proposition 1 (i) When rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < 1
2
) there
exists a () and a  such that, for  < () and  < ,
xi > x

i > x
c
i > x

j :
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(ii) When rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < 1
2
) and   () or   
xi > x

i > x

j  xc

i :
(iii) When rms R&D investments are strategic complements ( > 1
2
),
xc

i > x

i > x

j > x

i
for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above proposition provides a full ranking of rms equilibrium investment levels, as
it combines the well-known results by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), who compare
cooperative and simultaneous non-cooperative R&D levels, with Amir et al. (2000) analysis,
focussing on sequential vs. simultaneous non-cooperative outcomes. In particular, the former
study proved that, under high (low) spillovers, i.e. with  > 1
2
( < 1
2
) the cooperative
investment level is higher (lower) than the simultaneous Nash investment level, that is xc

i
> xi (x
c
i < x

i ). This nding, if combined with Amirs et al. (2000) results, implies that
xi > x

i > x
c
i (x
c
i > x

i and x

i > x

j > x

i ). Proposition 1 completes this ranking by
also including the cooperative investment levels. It can be noticed (see (11)) that the level of
spillover is crucial to determine the slope of the followers best-reply in the investment game.
That is, when the spillover rate is very low (case (i)), the followers best-reply is extremely
steep (and negatively sloped) and this player strongly contracts its equilibrium investment,
which is thus even lower than that resulting under a cooperative agreement. A rm investing
noncooperatively as leader at stage t1 can therefore protably expand its investment, and
this may occur in particular when the unit cost of investment in R&D (i.e. ) is very low and
the investor is unlikely to be imitated (low ). Under such circumstances, being a leader can
be more protable than participating to an R&D agreement. When, instead, the spillover
rates start to increase, the cooperative investment overcomes that of the follower, although
the leaders investment remains very high. Finally, for  > 1=2, cooperation implies the
e¢ cient and highest level of R&D investment, regardless of the level of investment costs.
In what follows, we perform some comparisons of the rms payo¤s obtained in the di¤er-
ent investment games.6 First, notice that, by the e¢ ciency of prole xc

, we already know
6We recall that in Amirs et al. (2000) paper, the following ranking is established for simultaneous
and sequential payo¤s in the symmetric case: Li (x
) > Ni (x
) > Fj (x
) for  < 12 and 
F
j (x
) >
Li (x
) > Ni (x
) for  > 12 , where L, N and F denote the leader/Nash simultaneous/follower roles,
respectively, in the di¤erent R&D investment games.
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that Ci
 
xc
 
> Ni (x
). Moreover, the following lemma proves that for  < 1
2
( > 1
2
) a
follower (leader) payo¤ can never be greater than that of a rm in a cooperative agreement.7
Lemma 1 Under high (low) spillovers  > 1
2
( < 1
2
) the prot of each rm in an R&D
agreement is always higher than the prot of a leader (follower), namely, Ci > 
L
i (
C
i > 
F
j ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following two propositions complete the full ranking of rm payo¤s in all di¤erent
scenarios and for all levels of spillover rates.
Proposition 2 When rms R&D investments are strategic substitutes ( < 1
2
): (i) there
exists a () and a  such that, for  < () and  < , the prot obtained by a rm
playing as leader in a sequential investment game is higher than that obtained in a cooperative
R&D agreement, and the following ranking arises
Li > 
C
i > 
N
i > 
F
j .
(ii) When, instead   () or    or both, the following ranking arises:
Ci  Li > Ni > Fj :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the e¤ect of  on the investment levels and on payo¤s, respec-
tively. When rm investments are strategic substitutes ( < 1=2) there exists a narrow range
of the spillover rate (between 0 and ()) for which being leader, and thus expanding the
investment, turns out to be extremely protable. This occurs only when the cost to invest
in R&D is extremely low ( < ).
[FIGURE 1 AND 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
7For ease of notation, in what follows Ci istand for 
C
i
 
xc
 
. We will use the same notational shortcut
in all noncooperative simultaneous and sequential payo¤s at the di¤erent investment subgames.
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The proposition below completes our ndings on rmsprotability under di¤erent arrange-
ments assuming that R&D investments are strategic complements:
Proposition 3 When rms investments are strategic complements ( > 1
2
) the prot ob-
tained by a rm in a cooperative R&D agreement is always higher than the prot obtained
by a rm investing as follower in the sequential investment game, and the following ranking
arises
Ci > 
F
j > 
L
i > 
N
i :
Proof. See the Appendix.
As it can be observed in gures 1 and 2, for  > 1=2, the highest level of investment
is selected by the research cartel. Under the sequential game the follower free-rides on the
leaders investment and gains a higher prot.
Finally, the next two propositions characterize all Nash and strong Nash stable timing-
partitions according to Denitions 1 and 2.
Proposition 4 (Nash stability) (i) When the spillover rate is such that  < (), and
 < , the Nash stable timing-partitions are given by
P (m) = [ f1; 2gt1 ;  f1gt1 ; f2gt1]:
(ii) When 1=2 >   () or    or both, the Nash stable timing-partitions are instead
given by
P (m) = [ f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 ;  f1gt1 ; f2gt1]:
(iii) Finally, for  2 (1=2; 1], the Nash stable timing-partitions are given by
P (m) = [ f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 ;  f1gt1 ; f2gt2 ;  f1gt2 ; f2gt1]:
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is obvious that, if we require the strong stability of timing-partitions, by the symmetry
of rms all noncooperative partitions in which rms invest simultaneously à la Nash are
Pareto-dominated by the cooperative allainces. Forming a cooperative research agreement to
coordinate costly investments in R&D is clearly more protable than playing the symmetric
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investment game à la Nash. If, however,  < (), we have proven that being leader in the
investment game yields a higher prot than playing cooperatively, and therefore the only
timing-partition that remains strongly stable is the alliance investing at time t1. Thus, a
cooperative agreement, to be stable, requires that rms anticipate strategically their joint
investments.
Proposition 5 (Strong stability) (i) when the spillover rate  < () and  < , the only
strong Nash stable R&D timing-partition is
P( bm) =  f1; 2gt1 :
(ii) - (iii) When 1    () or    or both, the strong Nash stable R&D timing-
partitions are
P( bm) =  f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Our results depart from those obtained in the previous literature. In particular, in our
setup, di¤erently from Amir et al. (2000), rms can form a strategic alliance to invest coop-
eratively in R&D, and this alliances may be part of a SPNE of the whole game. Moreover,
our model suggests that in forming alliance rms have to consider carefully the e¤ect of
timing. If rms procrastinate their cooperative investment, they may risk a defection by a
partner breaking the alliance to invest as leader. To avoid this problem, rms have to antic-
ipate strategically their joint investment in R&D. As illustrated in detail, this happens only
when investing in R&D is not very costly and spillovers are very low. For higher spillovers,
to discipline the stability of a research cartel might be easier and time-constraints for the
investment less relevant. Our model also shows that, without requiring Pareto-optimality,
even the noncooperative simultaneous (sequential) congurations are stable under low (high)
spillovers, i.e with  < 1=2 ( > 1=2), as already established in Amir et al. (2000). To
give an intuition, in a scenario characterized by strategic substitutes, the choice to form a
R&D alliance at a certain time might be also motivated by the need to avoid to play as
follower and singleton. Besides, when both spillovers and unit investment costs are very low,
a deliberate strategy meant to deter the exploitation of the rst mover advantage (i.e. a
possible strategy to appropriate innovation rents) might be in place. In a regime of high
appropriability - and thus of low outgoing spillovers - the probability for rms to cooperate
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is enhanced (as shown by Cassiman and Veugelers 2002, Belderbos et al. 2004), and the only
problem potentially a¤ecting stability may stem from the willingness to move rst. This is
not true any longer for higher spillovers and higher investment costs. In this case, we argue
that the two forces behind spillovers may push to collaborate at time 1, when the need to
internalize high incoming spillovers prevails, or at time 2, to avoid free-riding and potential
defections by partners, typical of low appropriability scenarios.
3.5 An Extension to n-symmetric Firms
Extending our model to n-symmetric rms would allow to check the stability of more complex
alliances between rms coordinating their investment in R&D. However, including more than
two rms into a model with endogenous timing makes the model itself highly unmanageable.
Only intuitive conclusions can be drawn employing our previous analysis and some well-
known existing results. A rst observation concerns the whole industry R&D agreement (or
the grand coalition of rms) investing at stage t2, i.e., using the above notation, the timing-
partition P =
 fNgt2 formed when at stage t0 all rms i = 1; 2; ::; n send the message
mi = (fNg ; t2). This partition can be strongly stable if every individual rm investing as
follower at stage t2 would be better o¤ than any rm participating to an R&D agreement
investing at stage t1 as leader. Thus, any coalition S  N of rms that deviates from the
grand coalition
 fNgt2 by sending one of these alternative messages, m0S = (fSg ; t2) or
m
00
S = (fSg ; t1), would induce either the simultaneous partition
(12) P (m
0
S) = (fSgt2 ; fjgt2j2NnS);
where all rms outside S are singletons or, analogously, the sequential partition
(13) P (m
00
S) = (fSgt1 ; fjgt2j2NnS):
However, if rms in coalition S cannot improve upon partition
 fNgt2 by playing as leaders
as in (13) they would not improve a fortiori by playing simultaneously as in (12). Therefore,
if we show that in the partition (13) all rms within the research cartel S (regardless of its
size) do not improve upon the cooperative partition
 fNgt2, the stability of the grand coali-
tion agreement is proved as a result. When investment decisions are strategic complements
( > 1=2), it can be proved that the payo¤ of a symmetric rm playing as singleton follower
against the coalition S playing as leader is always higher than the payo¤ of every rm in S.8
8For a formal proof of this statement see Currarini and Marini (2003, 2004).
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Hence, given the e¢ ciency of the grand coalition, it would be impossible for any coalition
S to improve by deviating as leader, given that followers would improve even more their
payo¤s. Similarly, it can be shown that when R&D investments are strategic substitutes
( < 1=2) a coalition S  N made of followers is beaten by individual rms investing as
leaders, and therefore the partition
 fNgt1 - made by the grand coalition of rms investing
at time t1- is strong Nash. The strong stability of these two cooperative timing-partitions
already observed in our duopoly model thus extends to an analogous endogenous timing
game played by n-symmetric rms.
4 A Duopoly Model with Asymmetric Spillovers
Including asymmetric spillovers into the model equals to introducing a higher degree of
realism. As is well-known (see e.g. Atallah 2005), asymmetries in knowledge transmission
may derive from di¤erences in protection practices, from geographical localization (e.g. Petit
et al. 2009), from product di¤erentiation (Amir et al. 2000), or from sequential moves in
the R&D game, as in R&D models with endogenous timing (Tesoriere 2008). Other sources
of asymmetry can arise from di¤erent technological capabilities, as in Amir and Wooders
(1999, 2000), where knowledge may leak only from the more R&D-active rm to the rival,
or from a better absorption capacity inuencing the outcome of a technological race, as in
De Bondt and Henriques (1995).
The spillover asymmetry arising in our model stems instead from the cooperative versus
the non-cooperative nature of the R&D game and from the timing of the R&D investment
process. The parameter i, (0  i  1) will represent henceforth the incoming spillover for
rm i = 1; 2. Moreover, let Ni denote the rm spillover rate under simultaneous noncooper-
ative R&D, Ci the spillover rate under R&D cooperation, and 
L
i , 
F
j the spillover rates for
the leader and the follower, respectively, in the sequential investment game, with i; j = 1; 2,
i 6= j.
Our assumptions on spillovers asymmetry are based on the following considerations:
(i) When the two rms invest simultaneously and noncooperatively at stage one or two
their spillover rate is assumed to be symmetric and lower than or equal to 0:5 (i.e., N1 =
N2  0:5). The idea is that the competition in R&D and the simultaneity of rm decisions
do not allow for a high amount of knowledge transmission.
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(ii) When a noncooperative sequential investment in R&D takes place, the spillover
rate can be though to be favorable to the rm playing as follower and unfavorable to the
rm playing as leader (i.e. Fj > 
L
i ). In particular we shall set 
F
j > 0:5 and 
L
i  0:5.
A sequential order of moves in the R&D investment game implies a greater amount of
knowledge leaking out from the leader to the follower than vice versa. The rationale is that
knowledge leaks also through imitation, thus leading to a strong advantage for the rm that
is able to observe the rst mover innovative outcome. Therefore, benets from spillovers
should be lower for a rst mover (see also Tesoriere 2008). Moreover, we assume that sector-
specic features determining the intensity of knowledge di¤usion9a¤ect to the same extent the
incoming spillover for the leader in the sequential game (i.e. Li ) and the incoming spillovers
for both rms in the simultaneous noncooperative game (i.e., Ni i = 1; 2). Therefore we
will set Li = 
N
i .
(iii) When the two rms play cooperatively and form a research cartel, they generally
also agree to share to some extent the knowledge obtained from their joint R&D e¤ort. It
seems realistic to assume that they might agree to fully share their knowledge, and therefore
their spillover rates will be symmetric and su¢ ciently high (i.e. C1 = 
C
2 close or equal to
one). Moreover, we assume that knowledge leaks occurring mainly through imitation and
favouring the follower in a sequential game are less intense if compared with the voluntary
exchange of technological knowledge typical of a research agreement. Thus, we maintain
that Ci > 
F
j , for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j:
Taking into account all the above inequalities, our assumptions on the relationship among
spillover values can be summarized as follows:
(14) 1  Ci > Fj > Li = Ni  0 i = 1; 2, j 6= i
with Li = 
N
i  0:5 and Fj > 0:5.
As in the previous section, we introduce here some assumptions needed to ensure the
existence and uniqueness of equilibria at all stages (see the Appendix for further details):
9Empirical literature aiming at distinguishing between knowledge spillovers that occur within or across
di¤erent sectors or technological elds leads to conclude that spillovers are technology-specic and, thus,
mainly intra-sectoral. As much as about sixty percent of the citations are directed to other patents classied
into the same technological eld (see, e.g., Ja¤e 1985, 1986; Cincera 1997; Malerba et al 2007), while the main
sources of knowledge are represented by competitors, suppliers and plants belonging to the same business
group (Crespi et al, 2008).
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B.1 (quantity stage constraint). As in the case of symmetric spillovers, a=c > 2.
B.2 (Prot concavity and best-reply contraction property). Again,  > 4=3.
B.3 (Boundaries on R&D e¤orts) For every rm i = 1; 2, Xi = [0; c] and  >
2a(Ci +1)
2
9c
,
for 0:5 < Ci  1.
4.1 Noncooperative Sequential R&D with Asymmetric Spillovers
Since only in the case of sequential moves at the investment stage our calculations di¤er from
the symmetric case analyzed in the previous sections, we shall deal henceforth extensively
with this scenario. Our aim is to investigate whether the asymmetry in the transmission of
knowledge between rms is relevant for the endogenous formation of research alliances.
Using an asymmetric-spillover specication, every rm objective function at the market
game stage is given by
i = (a  (qi + qj))qi  
 
c  xi   jxj

qi   x
2
i
2
with i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. Solving the game by backward induction, every rm payo¤ at the
investment stage can be obtained as:
(15) i (q (xi; xj)) =
1
9

(a  c) +  2  j xi + (2i   1)xj2   x2i2 :
Di¤erentiating (15) we obtain the best-reply for the follower in the investment game (here
player j):
gj(xi) =
2(2  Li )[(a  c)  (1  2Fj )xi]
9   2(2  Li )2
The sequential equilibrium investment levels for the two rms are given by:
xi
 figt1 ; fjgt2 = 2A (a  c)

2
 
Li
2   6Li   3 + 4B
( + 2AB2)
xj
 figt1 ; fjgt2 = 2
 
2  Li
 
(a  c)  2(1 2
F
j )A(a c)

2(Li )
2 6Li  3+4

B
2A

3Fj  2Li  6 4Li Fj +2(Li )
2
Fj +4
2 
!
9   2  2  Li 2
where
A =

9 + 8Li   2
 
Li
2   8 2
B =

3Fj   2Li   6   4Li Fj + 2
 
Li
2
Fj + 4

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Let equation (14) as well as B.1-B.3 hold. By comparing rms R&D equilibrium invest-
ment levels under asymmetric spillovers, we can state:
Proposition 6 There exists a ~ 2 (0; 1=2) such that, if Ni = Li  ~, then xj  xci >
xi > x

i . If instead 
N
i = 
L
i  ~, then xci  xj > xi > xi , for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j.
Proof. See the Appendix.
An illustration of this result is shown in Figure 3. To give an intuition, when (infra-
sectoral) spillovers are low, the asymmetry between the incoming spillover of the leader (Li )
and that of the follower (Fj ) is pronounced (since 
F
j is always greater than 0:5). Therefore,
the leader faces the lowest incentive to invest in R&D since the high outgoing spillover e¤ect
overcomes the rst-mover advantage e¤ect. On the other hand, the follower takes advantage
of a high learning opportunity and of low knowledge leaks. Moreover, in this case, the
R&D investment of the follower overcomes that of the cooperative rm, since a competive
e¤ect prevails. Conversely, when spillovers become higher, the asymmetry between leader
and follower decreases. In this case a free-riding e¤ect may prevail for both players and the
cooperative outcome may become convenient, since cooperation between rms succeeds in
internalizing knowledge externalities.
Firms prots could be compared only via numerical simulations. In what follows the
numerical values assigned to the parameters are as follows: a = 38, c = 18,  = 2. In
addition, we assume that in the case of cooperation rms agree to share a high amount of
technological knowledge. Thus we assign a constant value Ci = 0:8. Moreover we set the
incoming spillover of the follower such that 1  Ci > Fj > 0:5 (for instance Fj = 0:6 as in
Figures 3 and 4).
As depicted in gure 4, there exists a value ^ 2 (0; 1=2), such that the following payo¤s
ranking emerges:
Fj > 
C
i > 
N
i > 
L
i
for Li = 
N
i  ^. As a result, in this case the Nash equilibrium timing-partitions are
P (m) = [ f1; 2gt2 ;  f1gt2 ; f2gt2];
while the only strong Nash partition is given by
P( bm) =  f1; 2gt2 :
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When instead L1 = 
N
i  ^, the following payo¤ ranking comes out:
Ci > 
F
j > 
N
i > 
L
i
and, thus,
P (m) = [ f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 ;  f1gt2 ; f2gt2];
P( bm) =  f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 :
[FIGURES 3 AND 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE]
These results can be explained by considering that joint cooperative agreements at time t1
are particularly at risk when there is a strong incentive to be follower in the R&D investment
game. As a matter of fact, rms prefer to wait and observe the rivals move rather then trying
to reach an agreement. This happens when spillovers are extremely unbalanced (i.e. when
L1 = 
N
i  ^) towards the rms that wait before investing, thus conferring a strong follower-
advantage.These results are also in line with some empirical evidence, showing that rms
are more likely to choose a follower strategy if they operate in industries with low knowledge
leaks. Therefore, with low infra-sectoral spillovers, the only strongly stable R&D timing
partition is represented by the research cartel investing at time 2. On the other hand, timing
issues become less relevant when spillovers get higher and choosing a rst mover strategy
may become convenient for the alliance. This is typical of sectors characterized by intensive
knowledge exchanges often coupled with high absorptive capacity by the rms (Sofka and
Schmidt, 2005).
Our ndings complement the few existing results (Amir et al., 2000; Tesoriere, 2008)
on endogenous sequencing in R&D investment with asymmetric spillovers. In particu-
lar, Tesoriere (2008) considers only the noncooperative case with certain spillovers values
(L1 = 
N
i = 0 and 
F
j 2 (0; 1]). Under these assumptions he proves that the only timing
conguration that is SPNE involves simultaneous noncooperative play at the R&D stage
(with zero spillovers). In contrast, in our setup the noncooperative simultaneous congura-
tion may not be the only Nash stable timing-partition and, in addition, it is never strong
Nash stable, as rms always prefer to form an R&D cartel than playing (suboptimally) as
singletons the investment game.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper represents a rst attempt to bridge two usually distinct streams of the economic
literature, the endogenous formation of R&D agreements, and the endogenous timing of
R&D investments in a model with spillovers à la dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988). This
is done by introducing a new setup in which rms express both their intention to form or
not an alliance as well as the timing of their e¤ort in R&D. Our approach allows to assess
the stability of research cartels against deviations occurring over time. We show that the
nature of the interaction between the rms in the investment game plays an important
role. In particular, under symmetric spillovers and when the level of spillovers is extremely
low, both rms want to play the investment game as leaders and, as a result, they may
easily end up investing simultaneously either cooperatively or noncooperatively. In this
case, any cooperative agreement, to be stable, must contain a commitment to invest at an
initial stage. A cooperative agreement of this sort would remain stable against deviations
by coalitions of rms even if the number of symmetric rms gets arbitrarily higher than
two. When spillovers are higher, our model predicts that both sequential (noncooperative)
and simultaneous (cooperative) R&D congurations are stable against individual deviations.
However, only cooperative agreements are strongly stable and, in this case, opposite forces,
pushing towards either cooperation at the initial stage or to strategic delay of joint R&D
investment might be in place. We have argued that this approach, by introducing endogenous
timing into the model, may help in explaining some stylized facts, such as the tendency
to postpone a portion of agreements in some industries, as the bio-pharmaceutical sector.
Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and favourable to the rm investing as follower,
the model shows that an R&D alliance, to be stable, requires the joint investment to be
strategically delayed in order to avoid that a rm may break the agreement to exploit the
existing "second-mover advantage". This occurs, in particular, when the incoming spillover
of the leader is much lower then that of the follower, a scenario typical of low knowledge
transmission sectors.
6 Appendix
Proofs of Lemmata and Propositions
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Proof of Proposition 1. (i)-(ii) For  2 [0; 1=2), the following equation
(16)
 
xj   xc

i

=
2(a  c) (2  )  

  2(a  c)(1 + )
9   2(1 + )2 = 0
can be solved for () = 7
5
  3
10
p
2
p
5 + 2, which is strictly positive for   , where
 = 16=9. Condition A.3 for  < 1=2 requires that  > a(2 )(+1)
4:5c
and since this constraint
reaches its maximum for  = 1=2, it follows that for  2  a
2c
; 16
9

; there exists a () 2
[0; 1=2) for which
 
xj   xci

< 0. It can be checked that this interval for  is compatible
with a market size-cost ratio a=c  32=9. Moreover, by (16) for 1=2 >  > () and/or for
a  > 16=9,
 
xj   xci

> 0. Combining these facts with Amirs et al. (2000) ranking on
leader-follower and Nash simultaneous investments, the results follow. (iii) For  2 (1=2; 1],
by (16), it turns out that
 
xj   xci

< 0: Moreover it can be easily checked that
sign
 
xi   xj

= sign 2 (2   1)2 > 0
which holds for any  and, thus, also for  2 (1=2; 1]. Again, combining the above fact with
Amirs et al. (2000) results, the ranking between R&D investments is proven. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose by contradiction that for  > 1
2
Ci < 
L
i
and, following Amirs et al. (2000) (see footnote 7),
Ci < 
L
i < 
F
j :
It follows that
2P
i=1
Ci < 
L
i + 
F
j
contradicting the e¢ ciency of prole xc

i (q
). Similarly, for  < 1
2
let
Ci < 
F
j
and, according to Amirs et al. (2000) results,
Ci < 
F
j < 
L
i :
which again implies
2P
i=1
Ci < 
L
i + 
F
j ;
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which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) By Lemma 1 and employing Amirs et al. (2000) results
we know that, under low spillover rates, ( < 1
2
), either
(17) Li > 
C
i > 
N
i > 
F
j .
or
(18) Ci > 
L
i > 
N
i > 
F
j :
For  2 [0; 1=2) the following equation
(19) Ci   Li =
(a  c)2
9   2(1 + )2  
(a  c)2  6 + 3   22   42

= 0
has only one root () = 7
5
  3
10
p
2
p
5 + 2, requiring that  < 16=9 to be positive. Since, by
A.3,  > a(2 )(+1)
4:5c
and such constraint reaches its maximum for  = 1=2, we conclude that
for  2  a
2c
; 16
9

there exists a () 2 [0; 1=2) ensuring that the inequality  Ci   Li  < 0
holds true. (ii) For  2 [0; 1=2), when either    or  > 16
9
or both, it can be assessed
that
(20) Ci   Li =
(a  c)2
9   2(1 + )2  
(a  c)2  6 + 3   22   42

 0:
The payo¤s ranking can therefore be completed using Lemma 1 and Amirs et al. (2000)
results. 
Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemma 1 and Amirs et al. (2000), we know that under
high spillover rates ( > 1
2
), either
(21) Fj > 
C
i > 
L
i > 
N
i
or
(22) Ci > 
F
j > 
L
i > 
N
i :
For  2 [1=2; 1] and  2

a(+1)2
4:5c
;1

, the equation
 
Ci   Fj

= (a c)
2
9 2(1+)2  
(a c)2(9+8 22 8)(26 20 12 42+123+92 44 82+8)2
2
= 0
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is solved only for  = 1=2: It can be checked that for any other spillover rate 1   > 1=2,
the di¤erence
 
Ci   Fj

is positive and increases monotonically in . Only for  ! +1, it
occurs that
 
Ci   Fj
! 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) By proposition 2, for  2 [0; ()) < 1=2 and  <
, investing as leader at stage t1 is more protable for rms than forming a cooperative
agreement. As a result, the message m =
 f1; 2gt2 cannot be a Nash equilibrium, since
a rm i can protably deviates with an alternative message m0i = (fig ; t1) inducing the
timing-partition
 figt1 ; fjgt2. Similarly, all sequential timing-partitions  figt1 ; fjgt2 can
protably be objected by the j-th rm who, instead of playing as follower, would rather
prefer to invest simultaneously. This is feasible if it sends the message m0j = (fjg ; t1) ; and
induces the timing-partition
 figt1 ; fjgt1. Therefore, we remain with only two partitions f1; 2gt1 and  f1gt1 ; f2gt1 that cannot be protably objected by any rm. (ii) We know
by proposition 2 that, when  2 [(); 1=2) ; the payo¤ gained in a cooperative agreement
is higher than that obtained by a leader (follower or simultaneous) rm, and therefore both
cooperative timing-partitions
 f1; 2gt1 and  f1; 2gt2 are Nash-stable. Also the simultaneous
partition
 f1gt1 ; f2gt1 cannot be objected by individual deviations. (iii) For  2 (1=2; 1],
by proposition 3 the payo¤ gained in a cooperative agreement is the highest obtainable by a
rm and, thus, both cooperative timing-partitions
 f1; 2gt1 and  f1; 2gt2 are Nash-stable.
Also the sequential partitions
 f1gt1 ; f2gt2 and  f1gt2 ; f2gt1 cannot be protably objected
neither by a leader nor by a follower (see proposition 3), and the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) This result easily follows from proposition 2 and by the
fact that all other timing-partitions are Pareto-dominated by a cooperative agreement, with
the exception of the sequential partition
 figt1 ; fjgt2. However, since by proposition 2,
Ni (x
) > Fj (x
) for  < 1=2; the sequential partition
 figt1 ; fjgt2 can protably be
objected by the follower, who prefers to invest simultaneously and, by sending the message
m0j = (fjg ; t1) can induce the simultaneous partition
 figt1 ; fjgt1. However, the latter
partition can, in turn, be objected by a message
 f1; 2gt1 sent by both rms, and therefore,
is not Strong Nash stable. Finally, also the partition
 f1; 2gt2 can be objected by a rm
sending an alternative message m0i = (fig ; t1), hence inducing the relatively more protable
sequential partition
 figt1 ; fjgt2. (ii) By proposition 2 and 3 it follows that, for 2 [(); 1],
all sequential and simultaneous noncooperative payo¤s are dominated by the cooperative
agreements. As a result, the two message proles m = (fi; jg ; t1) ; (fi; jg ; t1)) and m =
26
(fi; jg ; t2) ; (fi; jg ; t2)) are both strongly undominated and the two cooperative partitions f1; 2gt1 ;  f1; 2gt2 are both strongly stable. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider rst the equilibrium investment levels under the
extreme assumptions that Li = 0, 
N
i = 0, 
F
j = 1, 
C
i = 1, i = 1; 2 with j 6= i. Thus, we
obtain:
(23) xi

Li =0;
F
j =1
= 2(a c)(3 4)
2
(112 1622+813 32)
and
(24) xj

Li =0;
F
j =1
= 4(a c)(9 8)
(112 1622+813 32) :
Moreover, substituting the above values for the spillover parameters into xi and x
c
i , as
derived in Section 3, we have that:
(25) xi

Ni =0
= 4(a c)
(9 4)
and
(26) xc

i

Ci =1
= 4(a c)
(9 8)
for i = 1; 2.
Then,
(a) By simply comparing (25) and (26), we obtain that xc

i

Ci =1
> xi

Ni =0
.
(b) Considering Eqs (24) and (23), it comes out that (xi  xj )

Li =0;
F
j =1
=  92 8+
16 < 0 i¤  >  4=9 + 4p10=9. This condition is implied by the SOC of rm i competing a
la Stackelberg at the R&D investment stage - evaluated at Li = 0, 
F
j = 1 - which requires
that ( 112 + 1622   813 + 32) < 0.
(c) Also, xj

Li =0;
F
j =1
> xc

i

Ci =1
i¤  > 4=3, and this is implied by assumption B.2.
(d) Finally, xi

Ni =0
> xi

Li =0;
F
j =1
for  > 4=9 + 4
p
2=9, which, as shown above, is
always respected.
Combining all inequalities above, we have
xj

Li =0;
F
j =1
> xc

i

Ci =1
> xi

Ni =0
> xi

Li =0;
F
j =1
:
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We now examine the ranking of R&D investments when Li = 
N
i = 0:5, still maintaining
the assumptions that Fj = 
C
i = 1. We obtain:
(i) xc

i

Ci =1
  xi

Ni =1=2
) = 3(a  c)(3 + 2) > 0.
(ii) xi

Ni =1=2
 xi

Li =1=2;
F
j =1
= (1623  256:52+195:75  63:875). This expression
is strictly positive for any   0:35.
(iii) (xc

i

Ci =1
  xj

Li =1=2;
F
j =1
) = (813   58:52 + 45   18), which is strictly positive
for  > 1=2:
(iv) (xj

Li =1=2;
F
j =1
  xi

NCi =1=2
) = 9(32   3 + 0:5) > 0 for  > 1=2.
It su¢ ces to take into account the conditions under B.2 as to the feasible values of 
to guarantee that all inequalities sub (i)-(iv) hold. Therefore, for Li = 
N
i = 0:5 and
Fj = 
C
i = 1, the ranking among equilibrium investments is such that:
xc

i

Ci =1
> xj

Li =1=2;
F
j =1
> xi

Ni =1=2
> xi

Li =1=2;
F
j =1
:
Let now introduce the more general hypotheses that Li = 
N
i < 0:5 and 1  Ci > Fj >
0:5, i; j = 1; 2 j 6= i. In what follows, we show that the ranking obtained for Li = Ni = 0,
Fj = 
C
i = 1 and the one obtained for 
L
i = 
N
i = 1=2, 
F
j = 
C
i = 1 are general, i.e. they
hold true for all spillover rates assumed.
First, we examine the ranking of R&D investments when Li = 
N
i = 0:5 (and 0:5 <
Fj < 
C
i = 1). It is easy to see that:
(1) xc

i

Ci =1
  xi

Ni =1=2
= 3(a  c)(3 + 2) > 0:
(2) Moreover,
xi

Li =1=2;
F
j
  xj

Li =1=2;
F
j
=
2(1  2Fj )(a  c)(Fj      2)
(2   1)(8 + 2F2j   8Fj   9)
< 0
due to the SOC for the prot maximization problem when rms compete simultaneously at
the investment stage and the constraints hold on  as stated above.
(3) Also,
xc

i

Ci =1
  xj

Li =1=2;
F
j
=
2(a c)[92+(10F2j  22Fj +10) 16 12F2j +32Fj ]
(2 1)(9 8)(9 8 2F2j +8Fj )
> 0
due to the SOC and the assumed constraints on  (see B.2).
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(4) Then, we obtain that
(xj

Li =1=2;
F
j
  xi

Ni =1=2
) =
4(a  c)(2  Fj )(2Fj   1)
3(2   1)(9   8  2F2j + 8Fj )
> 0
and nally
xi

Ni =1=2
  xi

Li =1=2;
F
j
=
2(a c)(2+3 Fj )(2Fj  1)
3(2 1)(9 8 2F2j +8Fj )
> 0:
As a result,
xc

i

Ci =1
> xj

Li =1=2;
F
j
> xi

Ni =1=2
> xi

Li =1=2;
F
j
:
The same ranking holds also for any value of Ci such that 0:5 < 
F
j < 
C
i < 1. This can
be proven considering that
(xc

i   xj )

Li =1=2;
F
j =
C
i =>1=2
= 2(a c)(1 2)[2
3+2( 1)2 (17 4)+17 92]
(2 1)(9 8 2+8) :
The above expression is strictly positive since the term in square brackets at the numer-
ator is negative (and decreasing in ), the second term at the denominator is the SOC for
simultaneous competition at the investment stage (see B.2), and the third term at the denom-
inator is negative for any  > 0:5 due to the constraints on  (see B.2). Now, Ci > 
F
j > 0:5
implies that xCi increases as well. Thus, a fortiori, x
c
i

Ci
> xj

Li =1=2;
F
j
. Therefore:
xc

i

Ci
> xj

Li =1=2;
F
j
> xi

Ni =1=2
> xi

Li =1=2;
F
j
for any value of Ci and 
F
j such that 0:5 < 
F
j < 
C
i < 1.
Now we consider the ranking at Li = 
N
i = 0 and we let 0:5 < 
F
j < 
C
i  1 Note that
xc

i

Ci =1
  xj

Li =0;
F
j
=
8(a c)(3 4)(2Fj  1)[(3Fj  6)+4]
(9 8)(722Fj +160 18F2j 2 2162 32+813 48Fj )
= 0
i¤ Fj = 1=2. Now, let 
C
i = 1  , with  su¢ ciently small. It is easy to see that @x
c
i
@Ci
> 0.
Therefore, xc

i

Ci
< xj

Li =0;
F
j =1=2
. Moreover, letting Fj be greater than 1=2, directly
implies that xc

i

Ci
< xj

Li =0;
F
j
, since xj is monotonically increasing in 
F
j .
Finally, xi

Li =0;
F
j
increases for Fj such that 0:5 < 
F
j < 1. We proceed now by
contradiction, wondering if the ranking xi

Li =0;
F
j
> xi

Ni =0
could ever be feasible. It
is easily found that the inequality xi > x

i contradicts the above nding, i.e. that
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xi

Li =1=2;
F
j
< xi

Ni =1=2
at Li = 
N
i = 0:5, and 
F
j > 0:5, combined with the fact
that xi is monotonically increasing in 
L
i . As a result,
xj

Li =0;
F
j
> xc

i

Ci
> xi

Ni =0
> xi

Li =0;
F
j
:
The fact that both xj and x

i are monotonically decreasing in 
L
i = 
N
i , and that,
conversely, xi is monotonically increasing in 
L
i completes the proof. Figure 3 illustrates
this proposition by means of a numerical example. 
Assumptions under Symmetric Spillovers
A.1 Straightforward manipulations of rmspayo¤s at the quantity-stage yield
(27) qi = q

j =
1
3
[(a  c) + (2  )xi + (2   1)xj]
and then
(28) i (q (x)) =
1
9
[(a  c) + (2  )xi + (2   1)xj]2   
2
x2i :
Since  2 [0; 1] and xi 2 [0; c], and given that for a rm the worst investment scenario occurs
when xi = 0,  = 0 and x

j = c, by (27) this yields
(29) qi (xi = 0; xj = c;  = 0) =
1
3
[(a  2c)] :
This condition implies that for
a > 2c
a unique interior (positive) Cournot prole of quantities, with associated positive equilibrium
prots, always exists.
A.2 It is easily shown that the investment-stage SOCs are respected, for every i = 1; 2;
for
@2i (x (q
))
@x2i
=
1
9
 
8 + 22   8   9 < 0
which requires that  > 2
9
(2  )2 and then strict-concavity of i (x (q)) in xi is guaranteed
for  > 8
9
for any  2 [0; 1]. Firmsbest-replies are obtained from (28) and are given by:
xi = gi (xj) =
2 (2  ) (a  c+ (2   1)xj) 
9 + 8   22   8 :
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Moreover, since for every rm
g0i (xj) =  
@2i (xi (q
) ; xj (q)) =@xi@xj
@2i (x (q)) =@x2i
=   2 (2   1) (2  ) 
8 + 22   8   9
increasing di¤erences of i (xi; xj) in (xi; xj) (and then non decreasing best-replies) are im-
plied by  > 1
2
and decreasing di¤erences (and non increasing best-replies) are implied by
 < 1
2
, given that
@2i (x (q
))
@xi@xj
=
2
9
(2   1) (2  ) :
To guarantee that uniqueness of Nash equilibrium x (q), a contraction condition would
serve the scope. This condition is respected for g0i (xj) < 1 when the function is increasing
and for g0i (xj) >  1; when the function is decreasing, thus requiring
(30) g0i (xj) =  
2 (2   1) (2  ) 
8 + 22   8   9 < 1
for  > 1
2
and
(31) g0i (xj) =  
2 (2   1) (2  ) 
8 + 22   8   9 >  1
for  < 1
2
. Condition (30) implies 
8 + 22   8   9 >  2 (2   1) (2  )
which is satised for
(32)  >
2
9
( + 1) (2  ) :
Since the RHS in (32) is monotonically increasing in , (32) becomes
 >
1
2
:
Condition (31) equals to
(33)  2 (2   1) (2  ) >    8 + 22   8   9 ;
and thus
(34)  >
2
3
(   1) (   2) :
Since the expression on the RHS of (34) is monotonically increasing in , we obtain the
condition  > 4
3
.
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Therefore, for any  2 [0; 1] the two rmsinvestment best-replies gi(xj) are contractions
if  > 4
3
.
A.3 In order to obtain interior values for the equilibrium investment level xunder sym-
metric spillovers and in all simultaneous, cooperative and sequential games, some assump-
tions are in order.
(i) Using the FOC for each rm i = 1; 2 when playing simultaneously the investment
game, we obtain that
@i (x (q
))
@xi
=
2 (2  )
9
[a  c+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj]  xi;
which, setting xi = 0, becomes
(35)
@i (0; xj)
@xi
=
2 (2  )
9
[a  c+ (2   1)xj] > 0
for every xj 2 [0; c]. As a result, to play xi = 0 is never a best-reply for a rm .
(ii) Secondly, when a rm i = 1; 2 participates to a cooperative R&D agreement, its FOC
is
@i (0; xj)
@xi
+
@j (0; xj)
@xi
=
2 (2  )
9
[a  c+ (2  )xi + (2   1)xj]  xi+
+
2
9
(2   1) (a  c+ (2  )xj + (2   1)xi)
which, evaluated at x =(0; xj), becomes
@i (0; xj)
@xi
+
@j (0; xj)
@xi
=
2
9
 
(a  c) (1 + ) + 10xj   4xj   42xj

> 0
for every xj 2 [0; c]. It is thus never rational for a rm in a cooperative agreement to play
xi = 0, no matter what the other rm does.
(iii) Finally, for a rm i = 1; 2 investing as a leader, the FOC is
(36)
@i (xi; gj(xi))
@xi
=
@i (xi; gj(xi))
@xi
+
@i (xi; gj(xi))
@xj
g0j(xi) = 0:
Notice that for  > 1
2
both @i(xi; xj)=@xj > 0 and g0j(xi) > 0 while for  <
1
2
; the opposite
holds, given that
@i (0; gj(0))
@xi
=
(a  c)  22 + 4  6   3  2  22   3 (2  )
2
 
8 + 9   22   82 > 0
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for  > 4
3
, and expression (35) guarantees that a rm as a leader will always invest a strictly
positive amount at a sequential equilibrium. Moreover, since the FOC for a follower is the
same as in the simultaneous Nash equilibrium, at the sequential equilibrium both rms will
never play the prole x=(0; 0). To conclude, we want to be sure that both rms will never
play their full cost reduction investment (corner solution), and that instead either their
best-replies or their cooperative decisions always lie below their maximum rational level
(37) xi = xj =
c
 + 1
:
(i) and (iii) Under noncooperative behaviour and using (37), this is guaranteed if
@i (x (q
))
@xi
=
2 (2  )
9

(a  c) + (2  ) c
 + 1
+ (2   1) c
 + 1

   c
 + 1
< 0
which holds for
(38)  >
a (2  ) ( + 1)
4:5c
:
As a result, for
(39)  >
a (2  ) ( + 1)
4:5c
, xi = gi(xj ) and x = (xi ; gj(xi ))
that is, both simultaneous and sequential investment equilibria are interior and lie below the
boundary points. Instead for
(40)   a (2  ) ( + 1)
4:5c
, xi =
c
 + 1
and x =

c
 + 1
;
c
 + 1

:
(ii) For a rm participating to a cooperative R&D agreement, its FOC evaluated at
x =

c
+1
; c
+1

is
@i (x (q
))
@xi
+
@j (x (q
))
@xi
= 2(2 )
9
h
a  c+ (2  ) c
+1
+ (2   1) c
+1
i
  xi+
+
2
9
(2   1)
h
a  c+ (2  ) c
+1
+ (2   1) c
+1
i
< 0
which holds if
(41)  >
a ( + 1)2
4:5c
:
Notice that for  < 1
2
( > 1
2
) the cooperative constraints on  is less (more) demanding than
the noncooperative constraints. Therefore, the constraint used to avoid full cost reductions
for  > 1
2
is (41) while for  < 1
2
we can impose that (38).
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Assumptions under Asymmetric Spillovers
B.1 It is easily found that equilibrium quantities as function of R&D investments are
given by:
(42) qi =
1
3

(a  c) +  2  j xi + (2i   1)xj
for i; j = 1; 2 ; i 6= j. Therefore
(43) i (q (x)) =
1
9

(a  c) +  2  j xi + (2i   1)xj2   2x2i :
Substituting in Eq. (42) or in Eq. (43), xi = 0, x

j = c, i = 0 and 0:5 < j <
1, we obtain that under asymmetric spillovers the condition a > 2c is again needed to
guarantee an interior Cournot prole of equilibrium quantities, and hence the strict positivity
of equilibrium prots.
B.2 Given our assumptions on spillovers for the simultaneous noncooperative R&D in-
vestment game, that is, Ni = 
N
j  0:5, the SOC for the investment game played a la
Cournot does not vary and requires that, for every i = 1; 2,
(44)  >
2
9
 
2  Ni
2
:
Being the RHS of (44) decreasing in Ni , we obtain that the most stringent condition on 
is given by  > 8
9
.
Note that this condition also guarantees that the SOC for the maximization problem of
an R&D alliance playing the investment game is respected. In this case the SOC is given by
 >
2
9
 
1 + Ci
2
;
and, being increasing in Ci - and given our assumptions on 
C
i - the above condition is
respected for  > 8
9
.
Moreover, when both rms play simultaneously the investment stage, and given that
Ni = 
N
j  0:5, best replies are contractions for  > 43 .
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In addition, to guarantee the uniqueness of the sequential equilibrium, the contraction
approach applied to the follower best-reply requires that
(45) g0j (xi) =
2
 
2j   1

(2  i) 
9 + 8i   22i   8
 < 1
Since 0:5 < Fj < 1 and the followers best-reply is increasing, (45) requires
(46)  >
2
9
(2  i)
 
1 + 2j   i

:
As a result, since (46) is increasing in j and decreasing in i, the most stringent constraint
on  becomes  > 4
3
.
B.3 First dene as (xi;xj) the point at which the boundary lines given by
xi = c  ixj
xj = c  jxi
intersect. It is easily found that:
xi =
c (1  i)
1  ij
xj =
c
 
1  j

1  ij
>From the prot maximization problem for a rm under asymmetric spillovers, we have
@i (x (q
))
@xi
=
2 (2  )
9
[(a  c) + (2  )xi + (2   1)xj]  xi = 0
from which the following best-reply is obtained:
gi (xj) =
2
 
2  j

(2 (a  c) + (2i   1)xj) 
9 + 8j   22j   8

In order to show that this best-reply lies underneath the point (xi; xj), it su¢ ces to impose
that, when the incoming spillover i is greater that 1=2 for at least one rm,
@i(xi;xj)
@xi
< 0. If
this condition holds true, then the equilibrium R&D investment prole will lie at the interior
of the full cost reduction boundary (xi; xj). More specically,
@i (x (q
))
@xi
=
2
 
2  j

9

(a  c) +  2  j xi + (2i   1)xj   =
=
2
 
2  j

9
"
(a  c) +  2  j c (1  i)1  ij + (2i   1) c
 
1  j

1  ij
#
   c (1  i)
1  ij
< 0
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and, since

(a  c) +  2  j c(1 i)1 ij + (2i   1) c(1 j)1 ij

= a, the above inequality be-
comes
2a
 
2  j

9
   c (1  i)
1  ij
< 0
requiring that:
(47)  >
2
9
a
 
1  ij
  
2  j

c (1  i)
:
Given that, for a sequential equilibrium, 1 > Fj > 0:5 and 0  Li  0:5, the constraint
in (47), which is increasing in i and decreasing in j, boils down into the following condition
on :
(48)  >
a
2c
which is the most stringent one for rm i. The boundary points required for an interior
equilibrium under noncooperative behavior and simultaneous moves were derived in the
previous section. By simply substituting for Ni ; for i = 1; 2; we have
(49)  >
2a
 
2  Ni
  
Ni + 1

9c
:
Moreover, since our assumptions assumptions on spillovers imply that Ni  0:5, and given
that (49) is increasing in Ni , the (most stringent) condition on  becomes:
(50)  >
a
2c
:
For a rm entering an R&D alliance, the constraint on  does not vary with respect to
the case with symmetric spillovers, but for the assumption 0:5 < Ci  1. As a result, the
condition
(51)  >
2a
 
Ci + 1
2
9c
:
boils down into:
(52)  >
8a
9c
:
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Also in this case the constraint on  required under cooperation (eq. 52) is the most
stringent and thus will be the one to be imposed.
Finally, combining both constraints in B.1 and in B.3 for the sequential investment game,
the most demanding condition on  is  > 1. Moreover, in the noncooperative simultaneous
investment stage, the same constraint on  has to be satised, whilst, under the cooperative
case, it is required that  > 16=9.
This is the most stringent condition also employed in the numerical simulations with
asymmetric spillovers.
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Fig.1 - R&D investment for the leader (dashed line), follower (continuous line) and cooperative
rm (dotted line) for a = 38, c = 18,  = 1:7,  2 [0:1] :
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Fig.2 - Payo¤ for the leader (dashed line), follower (continuous line) and cooperative rm (dotted
line) for a = 38, c = 18,  = 1:7,  2 [0:1] :
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Fig 3: R&D investment for a leader (dashed line), a follower (solid thick line), a cooperative firm (dotted thick 
line), a non-cooperative firm (solid line) for a=38, c=18, γ = 2, ,6.0=Fjβ .8.0=Ciβ  
 
Fig 4: payoffs for a leader (dashed line), a follower (solid thick line), a cooperative firm (dotted thick line), 
a non-cooperative firm (solid line) for a=38, c=18, γ = 2, ,6.0=Fjβ .8.0=Ciβ  
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